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OBAMA'S EQUIVOCAL DEFENSE OF
AGENCY INDEPENDENCE
Kevin M. Stack*
You can't judge a President by his view of Article II. At the
very least, only looking to a President's construction of Article II
gives a misleading portrait of the actual legal authority recent
Presidents have asserted.
President Obama is no exception, as revealed by his defense
of the constitutionality of an independent agency from challenge
under Article II in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board' (PCAOB) in the Supreme Court
this term. The PCAOB is an independent agency, located inside
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), created to regulate
accounting of public companies in the wake of the WorldCom
and Enron accounting scandals by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.2 The Supreme Court's decision to review the
constitutionality of the PCAOB required the Obama
Administration, in its first year, to take a stance on several issues
that are viewed as litmus tests for theories of Article II, including
* Associate Dean for Research and Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University
School of Law. I am grateful to Mark Brandon, Lisa Bressman, Jill Hasday, and Robert
Mikos for comments on earlier drafts.
1. 78 U.S.L.W. (U.S. 2010). This essay on the implications of the Obama
Administration's arguments in the PCAOB case for the Administration's construction of
presidential power was written prior to the Supreme Court's decision in the case. For a
helpful analysis of the issues and arguments raised in this case, see the Roundtable in the
Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc, including Peter L. Strauss, Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51 (2009);
Richard H. Pildes, Putting Power Back into Separationof Powers Analysis: Why the SECPCAOB Structureis Constitutional,62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 85 (2009); Gary Lawson,
The "Principal" Reason Why the PCAOB is Unconstitutional, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 73 (2009); Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, Remove Morrison v. Olson,
62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 103 (2009); Harold H. Bruff, On Hunting Elephants in
Mouseholes, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 127 (2009); Peter L. Strauss, Our Twenty-First
Century Constitution, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 121 (2009); Steven G. Calabresi &
Christopher S. Yoo, Why Professors Bruff and Pildes are Wrong about the PCAOB Case,
62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 133 (2009); Gary Lawson, It Depends, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 139 (2009).
2. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28, & 29 U.S.C. (2006)).
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whether the appointments clause permits the agency's
appointment to be vested in the SEC3 and whether the "good
cause" restriction on its removal by the SEC4 violates Article II
and separation-of-powers principles.
At the level of constitutional doctrine, the fact of President
Obama's defense of the constitutionality of the PCAOB might
suggest his acquiescence in isolating executive officials from
presidential supervision. At the very least, it appears to place his
Administration at the opposite end of the spectrum on executive
power from the Reagan Administration, which actively sought a
Supreme Court ruling overturning the removal restrictions on
independent agencies as violating the President's power under
Article II. But the contrast between President Obama's and
President Reagan's constitutional positions on independent
agencies is revealing, I shall argue in this early reflection on
President Obama's views on executive power, in part because it
vastly overstates the differences in the powers these Presidents
claimed to possess.
A deeper look at President Obama's defense of the
PCAOB, as reflected in his Solicitor General Elena Kagan's
arguments to the Supreme Court, shows that it is premised on an
assertion of a level of control over the agency, despite its
independent status, that is roughly equivalent to what President
Reagan's lawyers sought to achieve through a constitutional
decision striking down congressionally-imposed good cause
restrictions on the removal of independent agency officials.
Presidents Obama and Reagan, in other words, claim a similar
level of control over independent agencies, just on different legal
grounds. For President Reagan, this control was warranted by
Article II, and achievable only through constitutional
invalidation of removal restrictions; for President Obama, the
statutory good cause removal protections do not impede nearplenary presidential supervision of the agency.
What explains both this shift from constitutional to
statutory ground-and basic convergence on the level of control
these President's viewed as warranted? To be sure, Presidents
face tremendous incentives to assert control over the federal
bureaucracy As Congress delegates more and more power to
3.
4.
5.
(2003).

15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(4)(A) (2006).
Id. § 7211(e)(6).
See DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 4
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federal agencies, including independent agencies, control over
the federal bureaucracy is vital to a President's capacity to
implement his policies.6 That shared interest might help explain
the rough convergence between President Obama's and
President Reagan's views on the level of control they assert. It
does not explain, however, the shift in the legal grounds on
which that control is asserted. The way in which President
Reagan's lawyers litigated these issues, I argue, set in motion
that shift in legal grounds; in particular, their litigation opening
the door to the broad interpretation of good cause provisions
that President Obama adopts. The shift might be seen as the
Obama Administration capitalizing on the precedent created
during the Reagan era. In that respect, it offers a cautionary tale
for reading too much into the constitutional stance of a President
without attention to underlying questions of statutory
interpretation. At another level, Obama's lodging of his control
on statutory grounds may suggest a different vision of the
constitutional allocation of authority between Congress and the
Executive.
I. THE REAGAN LEGACY
To appreciate the meaning of President Obama's defense of
the PCAOB, it makes sense to look back to the Reagan-era
precedent with which President Obama's defense engages, and
in particular Morrison v. Olson.7 The Reagan Administration
hoped to overturn the constitutionality of independent agencies,
but in their attempt to avoid Supreme Court review of the
independent counsel statute, which they thought would be a bad
case to advance this challenge, the Reagan Administration
lawyers ended up helping to establish the grounds for an analogy
between the President's control over independent and executive
agencies that President Obama makes central to his defense of
the PCAOB. 8
President Reagan, we recall, campaigned on a broadly
deregulatory platform.9 While implementing any presidential
6. Id.
7. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
8. In other writing, I examine how these and other choices made by the Reagan
Administration's top lawyers influenced the outcome and meaning of Morrison v. Olson.
See Kevin M. Stack, The Story of Morrison v. Olson: The Independent Counsel and
Independent Agencies in Watergate's Wake, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
9.

See, e.g., DAVID

A. STOCKMAN,

THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS: How THE
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agenda requires asserting control over the vast administrative
state, implementing a platform based on deregulation makes
that control all the more important. President Reagan made
enduring strides in this direction, including centralizing review of
significant regulatory activities of executive agencies in the
Office of Management and Budget." In the Administration's
effort to centralize regulatory policy within the White House,
Reagan officials viewed independent agencies as a serious
problem. As President Reagan's Solicitor General Charles Fried
writes, their "independence of presidential authority was
considered the extreme example, a kind of emblem, of one of
the biggest obstacles to the administration's program."'1 This
view that independent agencies were critical barriers to the
President's agenda helps explain the legal positions and
strategies taken by President Reagan's Department of Justiceand also contrasts sharply with President Obama's view as
represented in the PCA OB litigation.
Among the various routes to reducing or overcoming the
resistance of these agencies to President Reagan's policies, top
lawyers at the Department of Justice focused on their
constitutionality. In particular, they sought a Supreme Court
decision that "would hold that agency commissions served at the
pleasure of the President, and that statutory limitations on their
removal were unconstitutional."' 3 This approach was premised
on two legal grounds-statutory construction of good cause
removal restrictions, and the powers Article II of the
Constitution grants the President.
The statutory construction question posed by good cause
restrictions is what grounds for removal they allow: Mere lack of
confidence in the office-holder? Policy disagreement?
Misapplication of the law? Insubordination? Complete neglect
of duty or ineptitude? It is clear that the Reagan Administration
took good cause restrictions as providing significant protection
from removal, including, it appears, protection from removal
REAGAN REVOLUTION FAILED 103 (1986) ("Sweeping deregulation was another pillar

of the supply-side platform.").
10. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1988). The basic structure of regulatory review initiated by Executive Order 12,291 has
endured since the Executive Order was issued.
11.

CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-

A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 154-55 (1991).
12. Executive Order 12,291 did not apply to independent agencies. See Exec. Order
No. 12,291, § 2.
13. FRIED, supra note 11, at 157.
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based on policy disagreements. Indeed, if the Reagan
Administration had believed that a policy disagreement was a
sufficient ground for removal of an officer protected by a good
cause restriction, then, at least in principle, independent agencies
would not have posed such a significant a legal obstacle to the
Administration's program. Of course, they still would pose a
significant political obstacle, requiring a potentially distracting
removal of officials perceived to be isolated from the President's
policy preferences.
By construing the good cause provisions as providing
protection from removal based on a policy disagreement, the
Reagan Administration took a relatively conventional view of
the protections these removal restrictions provide, and one
consistent with Humphrey's Executor v. United States,14 the
leading decision on removal of principal officers at the time. In
Humphrey's Executor, the Supreme Court made clear that the
good cause restriction protecting the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) protected the Commissioners from termination at will,
and held that these restrictions did not unconstitutionally
infringe the President's executive power. The Federal Trade
Commission Act granted Commissioners of the FTC seven-year
terms, and vested the President with the right to remove them
"for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."' 5
President Roosevelt removed Commissioner Humphrey without
a reason, 6 and did not claim that his termination of Humphrey
was based on one of the enumerated grounds of the removal
provision. 7 The Supreme Court held that the combination of the
statute's specification of fixed terms in office and for cause
provision limited the executive's power to terminate to "the
causes enumerated, the existence of which none is claimed
here.' 8 By implication, it is clear from Humphrey's Executor
that simply terminating officer for no reason, as one could with
an officer that served at the President's pleasure, does not
constitute cause. But Humphrey's Executor itself left open the
question of what constitutes cause, and specifically did not
foreclose the possibility that policy disagreement could
14. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
15. See id. at 622.
16. President Roosevelt wrote to Commissioner Humphrey: "You will, I know,
realize that I do not feel that your mind and my mind go along together on either the
policies or the administering of the Federal Trade Commission, and frankly, I think it is
best for the people of this country that I should have a full confidence." Id. at 619.
17. Id. at 626.
18. Id.
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constitute cause.19 In any event, given the ambiguity about what

would constitute cause, the Reagan Administration appeared to
adopt the conventional view that policy disagreement alone did
not constitute cause.
That statutory conclusion created the grounds for a serious
constitutional question -namely, whether such a restriction
constituted an unconstitutional infringement on the President's
Article II power. On that question, the Reagan Administration
sought to create the foundations for a Supreme Court decision
that would overturn the constitutional holding of Humphrey's
Executor. Humphrey's Executor had justified the good cause

restrictions on doctrinally weak grounds. The Court rested the
constitutionality of these removal restrictions on the
characterization of the FTC as acting "in part quasi legislatively
and in part quasi judicially." 20 With regard to such officers, as
opposed to those performing executive functions, the Court
reasoned, Congress could constitutionally impose removal
restrictions. This reasoning had two notorious problems. First, it
was very hard to distinguish the functions the FTC served from
those performed by many agencies. Second, it suggested that by
virtue of the FTC's functions, it must exist somehow outside the
executive branch (and thus presidential control).
President Reagan's lawyers sought to implement a view of
Article II under which there was no place for a set of officers
that existed outside of the President's direct control. The theory
of executive power that supported this view had several key
elements. Although it is uncontroversial that Article II vests
executive power in a unitary President,1 the question is what
follows from that choice as to Congress's authority to structure
the executive branch. The Reagan Administration's lawyers
argued that Article II's vesting of "executive power" in the
President 22 combined with the President's authority to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" 23 required that the
President have power to supervise and control the
implementation of all federal law, and barred Congress from
imposing restrictions on his power to fire executive officers at
will. Aspects of that position appeared in opinions of the Office
19. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 573, 609 (1984).
20. Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 628.
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; see also Strauss, supra note 19, at 599.
1.
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
4.
23. Id. art. II, § 3, cl.

HeinOnline -- 26 Const. Comment. 588 2009-2010

2010]

DEFENSE OFAGENCY INDEPENDENCE

589

of Legal Counsel in the early 1980s. 4 Under that construction of
Article II, there was simply no place for removal restrictions on
executive officers. In short, the Reagan Administration accepted
the implied statutory construction of Humphrey's Executor
under which the removal provisions prevented firing
independent agency heads for policy disagreements, but sought
to overturn Humphrey's Executor's constitutional validation of
this restriction.
The Reagan Administration's effort to implement this
constitutional vision, however, foundered in the Supreme Court
on two occasions. The first setback came in Bowsher v. Synar,25
in which the Court reviewed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.
The Act granted the Comptroller General power to make
binding decisions concerning budget reductions.26 Power to
remove the Comptroller General, however, was vested in
Congress.27 The Comptroller could be removed only by
impeachment or by a joint resolution of Congress on the grounds
of good cause. 28 Because these removal provisions included a
good cause restriction and vested removal authority in Congress,
they were open to two different grounds for challenge, both of
which the Justice Department asserted. 29 The narrower ground
was that Congress could not grant itself a role in the removal of
executive officials. That ground would invalidate the removal
provisions in the Act, but do little to advance the Reagan
Administration's interest in a constitutional challenge to the
removal restrictions applicable to most independent agencies.

24. Removal of Members of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 6 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 180, 180 (1982) (arguing the primary functions of the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation were "executive in nature, and thus not such as would
permit Congress constitutionally to insulate its members from the President's removal
power," despite the Council's statutory designation as independent); Litigation
Authority of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Title VII Suits Against
State and Local Governmental Entities, 7 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 57, 64 (1983) (EEOC
could not take a contrary litigation position to the Attorney General because the "whole
of the Executive power ... is vested exclusively in the President"); Constitutionality of
Statute Requiring Executive Agency to Report Directly to Congress, 6 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 632, 632 (1982) ("Separation of powers requires that the President have ultimate
control over subordinate officials who perform purely executive functions, which
includes the right to supervise and review the work of such officials.").
25. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
26. Id. at 718.
27. See 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)(B) (1982); see also Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727-28.
28. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 720, 728.
29. See Brief for the United States at 31-32, 48, Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714 (Nos. 851377, 85-1378 & 85-1379).
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The broader ground was that the President must have
authority to remove the Comptroller General at will because the
Comptroller General exercises executive power. "Whatever may
be the nature and scope of the functions that Congress
constitutionally may remove from the general administration of
the laws and assign to an agency composed of members who are
independent of the President's control," Solicitor General
Charles Fried argued in Bowsher, "Congress clearly cannot vest
in such an officer the authority to intrude upon and effectively
direct the execution of the laws by the President."' Embracing
that position would open the door to a direct challenge to the
constitutionality of independent agencies, many of which engage
in execution of the law.
The Supreme Court, as we know, opted for the narrower
ground, namely, that "Congress cannot reserve for itself the
power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the
laws."'" The Court also held that the removal power of Congress,
even though restricted to good cause, rendered the Comptroller
General "subservient to Congress."32 In the end, the Bowsher
decision, although a technical victory for the Reagan Justice
Department, represented a setback for the Department's
broader interest in implementing a strongly unitary conception
of the President's powers. The Court had an opportunity to
establish a critical building block for that larger constitutional
vision, and it declined. Bowsher's treatment of the Comptroller
as subservient to Congress despite the good cause protection,
however, suggested the possibility that these restrictions might
be construed to provide little restraint on the President's power
to remove an official for a policy disagreement.33
The Supreme Court took up that suggestion, a suggestion
which becomes central to President Obama's defense in
PCAOB, in Morrison v. Olson, but used it to deal the Reagan
Administration a second set-back in its effort to overturn the
constitutionality of removal restrictions. Prior to the actual
litigation of the independent counsel statute in the case that
became Morrison v. Olson, the Reagan Justice Department

30. Id. at 48.
31. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726.
32. Id. at 730.
33. In 1986, Professor Geoffrey Miller elaborated the possibility of a President
construing a good cause provision to permit removal for failure to comply with the
President's instructions. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT.
REV. 41, 44.
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devised a strategy aimed at thwarting review of the independent
counsel statute while allowing pending investigations to
continue. 34 It was that strategy that prepared the ground in
unanticipated ways for the Supreme Court's decision in
Morrison v. Olson to uphold the independent counsel statute,
and ultimately for President Obama's defense of the PCAOB.
The Reagan lawyers understood that it was important to
avoid Supreme Court review of the independent counsel statute
for a variety of reasons. To begin with, unlike almost every other
independent agency, the independent counsel had strong public
appeal as a symbol of Watergate reforms. Moreover, the fact
that Lt. Col. Oliver North brought the first significant
constitutional challenge to the independent counsel statute
compounded the Administration's general misapprehension
about litigating good cause removal provisions in the context of
the independent counsel statute. While Reagan Administration
officials surely wished for the independent counsel statute to
disappear, even among independent counsel cases, the North
litigation was the worst vehicle to mount a challenge. The IranContra investigation had captured public attention and would be
a "terrible case[] in which to challenge a law that the public was
told guaranteed impartial justice."35
In hopes of avoiding review, the Attorney General offered
independent counsels "parallel" appointments within the
Department of Justice as special prosecutors, under the same
statutory authority that had been used to create the Watergate
special prosecutor. The regulations establishing the parallel
appointment granted the counsel identical authority and
jurisdiction to that as provided by the independent counsel
statute,36 but were issued under the Attorney General's statutory
authority to appoint ad hoc special prosecutors, who could be
removed at will. If independent counsels accepted these parallel
34. Office of Independent Counsel, General Powers and Establishment of
Independent Counsel-Iran/Contra, 52 Fed. Reg. 7270, 7270 (March 10, 1987) (codified
at 28 C.F.R. §§ 600 & 601 (1988)) (Attorney General Meese introduced the parallel
appointment regulations with a summary saying, "I have found it advisable to assure the
courts, Congress and the American people that this investigation will proceed in a clearly
authorized and constitutionally valid form regardless of the eventual outcome of the
North litigation [challenging the independent counsel statute.]").
35. FRIED, supra note 11, at 137.
36. See General Powers and Establishment of Independent Counsel-Iran/Contra,
52 Fed. Reg. at 7270-273. On the provisions for removal protection, compare 28 U.S.C. §
596 (2006) with the parallel provisions of 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(c)-(d) (2009); see also In re
Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50, 52-53 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting the parallel in removal
protection).
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appointments, the Department reasoned, they could render
moot the question of the constitutionality of the independent
counsel statute, because the investigation had a separate
authorization furnished by the parallel appointments.
With regard to the North investigation, the strategy worked.
Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh accepted the parallel
appointment the day it was offered. 7 The United States then
argued that North's challenge to the constitutionality of the
independent counsel statute was not reviewable. The D.C.
Circuit agreed with the United States.38 At the center of the D.C.
Circuit's reasoning was its conclusion that there was no
difference in the actions Walsh would take if he were acting
solely on the basis of the authority vested in him by the Attorney
General and those he would take with the addition of the
protections of the independent counsel statute, and therefore no
point in review."
This is a startling conclusion, as Judge Stephen Williams'
partial dissent recognized. ' To reach it, the D.C. Circuit had to
take the view that statutory good cause restrictions did not
provide additional, or at least significant, independence. Indeed,
based on the D.C. Circuit's decision, the position of an
independent counsel, removable by the Attorney General only
for good cause, becomes the rough equivalent of a special
prosecutor, removable by the Attorney General at will. But once
that is true, it is unclear how much protection or insulation from
presidential influence statutory good cause removal provisions
provide. As a result, this position undermines the starting
premise of the Reagan Administration's legal challenge to
independent agencies- that agencies protected by good cause
removal provisions were the "biggest obstacle" to the
implementation of presidential policy. But it also suggests that
the President has much of the control the Reagan
Administration's lawyers had sought, just not through an express
constitutional overruling of good cause restrictions.
When the independent counsel in a separate investigation of
Theodore Olson declined the Attorney General's parallel
appointment, and the D.C. Circuit held that the independent
counsel statute was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court review

37.
38.
39.
40.

In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d at 52-53.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 59-62.
Id. at 63-69 (Williams, J., concurring and dissenting).
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of the statute became inevitable. Interestingly, in the Supreme
Court's decision in Morrison v. Olson, the Court embraced the
analogy between special prosecutor and independent counsel,
despite their different removal protections. This analogy first
arose in the Court's analysis of Olson's challenge to the statute
under the appointments clause. Among other things, Olson
argued that the independent counsel was a principal officer
under the appointments clause, and therefore her appointment
must be vested in the President.' The Court concluded that the
independent counsel was an inferior, not principal officer,
supporting this conclusion with a comparison to the Watergate
Special Prosecutor. The Court noted that the Watergate Special
Prosecutor, "whose authority was similar to that of appellant,"
was considered in United States v. Nixon to be a "subordinate
officer."42 The Watergate Special Prosecutor was (notoriously)
removable at will. Thus, by suggesting that the Watergate
Special Prosecutor's inferior officer status was consistent with
the conclusion that the independent counsel was also an inferior
officer, the Court declined to read the good cause removal
provision as creating a sharp distinction between the two
prosecutors. The fact that they were both removable by the
Attorney General mattered more than the statutory good cause
removal protection that the independent counsel enjoyed. The
parallel appointments (and the D.C. Circuit's conclusion in the
North litigation that the parallel appointment prevented
constitutional review of the Act) appeared to domesticate the
very aspect of the independent counsel-statutory independence
based on good cause removal protection-most likely to
distinguish the counsel from the constitutionally uncontroversial
special prosecutor.
When the Court turned to consider whether the good cause
protections were unconstitutional infringements on the
President's power, it flatly rejected the view that the exercise of
executive power itself prohibits Congress from imposing good
cause removal restrictions. Casting aside the doctrine sugjgested
by its previous decisions in Myers v. United States and
Humphrey's Executor v. United States" that the validity of
removal restrictions turned on whether or not the officer
engaged in purely executive functions, or quasi-legislative quasi41.
42.
43.
44.

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 673 (1988).
Id. at 673 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694 n.8 (1974)).
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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adjudicative functions, 5 the Court took the central question to
be whether "the removal restrictions are of such a nature that
they impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional
duty."4 Applying this functional test, the Court rejected the idea
that good cause removal restrictions amounted to much of a
constraint on the President. Even with the good cause removal
restriction, the Court ventured that the Attorney General retains
"ample authority to assure that the counsel is competently
performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that
comports with the provisions of the Act."47 At this point, one can

hear in the background the analogy between the special
prosecutor and the independent counsel. If the Attorney
General's authority over both prosecutors make them
subordinate, as suggested by the Court's reasoning under the
appointments clause, then it would be difficult to conclude that
the removal provision itself obstructs the Attorney General's
control over the independent counsel (putting aside, of course,
that that was the point of the provision). 8
What emerges from Morrison v. Olson, the ultimate
outcome of the Reagan Administration's litigation of the statute
of independent agencies, is a constitutional validation of the
good cause removal provisions, but a validation that undermines
much of the protection those provisions were thought to ensure.
Indeed, following Morrison, it would be hard to imagine that
Reagan officials would still view independent agencies as the
most significant legal obstacle to the implementation to their
program. Rather, the Court has suggested that even with good
cause protections, the President retains "ample" authority over
them. It is that victory for presidential influence that frames the
Obama Administration's defense of the PCAOB.
II. OBAMA'S DEFENSE OF AGENCY INDEPENDENCE
When a President defends the constitutionality of a statute
that imposes restrictions on his powers, it is worth carefully
45. Id. at 689.
46. Id. at 691. For an earlier, quite similar articulation of this view, see Peter
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573,609-616 (1984).
47. Morrison,487 U.S. at 692.
48. See S. REP. No. 95-170, at 65-66, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4281-82
(stating that the independent counsel statute aimed to create a prosecutor who is
"independent, both in reality and appearance, from the President and the Attorney
General").
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attending to the way in which he or she does so. President
Obama's defense of the constitutionality of the PCAOB, as
revealed by Solicitor General defense in the brief of the United
States and also in oral argument in the Supreme Court in
PCAOB, is no exception. Solicitor General Kagan's defense of
the PCAOB's removal protections takes up the invitation of
both Bowsher and Morrison to construe good cause removal
provisions very broadly. 49 The extent of her equivocation as to
what protection removal provisions provide is most clearly
revealed in her argument that seeks to bring the PCAOB's
under the mantel of Morrison.
Solicitor General Kagan's first line of defense for the
PCAOB's removal protections was to rely on Humphrey's
Executor, in essence saying that Humphrey's Executor is
sufficient to validate the PCAOB. This argument has two basic
premises. The first is relatively uncontroversial: Humphrey's
Executor clearly validates the good cause restrictions that are
presumed to apply to the President's ability to remove the SEC
Commissioners. 0 Indeed, Humphrey's Executor held that a good
cause restriction preserves a constitutionally sufficient level of
control by the President. The second step turns on the scope of
the SEC's control over the PCAOB. Solicitor General Kagan
argued that, despite the good-cause restriction protecting the
PCAOB, the SEC has extremely broad control over the Board, a
view invited by the broad powers granted by the statute over the
PCAOB to the SEC." She specifically argued that the good
cause restriction governing the PCAOB itself "affords the
Commission broad authority over individual Board members for
52
conduct at the heart of their statutory responsibilities.
Solicitor General Kagan puts these two premises together to
reach the conclusion that the double good-cause removal
provision is constitutional because it provides ample authority
for the President to take care that the laws are faithfully
49. With regard to the independent counsel statute, John Manning has suggested
that, in order to avoid serious constitutional questions about the President's control over
the independent counsel, there are grounds to construe that good cause provision to
allow substantial presidential supervision (or at least to hesitate before construing the
removal provision more restrictively). See John F. Manning, The Independent Counsel
Statute: Reading "Good Cause" in Light of Article 11, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1285, 1288, 1335
(1999). In a sense, President Obama's defense of PCAOB takes this same approach to
the removal provisions in protecting PCAOB.
50. Brief for the United States at 48, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, No. 08-861 (Oct. 13, 2009).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 51 (commenting on § 7217(d)(3)).
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executed: 3 If the President has constitutionally sufficient control
over the SEC, and the SEC has plenary control over the Board,
then the President should have sufficient control over the Board.
As Solicitor General Kagan anticipates in her brief for the
United States, Morrison v. Olson poses a difficulty for this
position. Morrison is the Supreme Court's most extensive recent
consideration of a good-cause provision that vests removal in an
officer other than the President. Framed in this way-as a

judgment about good cause provision that vest removal in a
officer other than the President-the application of Morrison is
difficult to avoid. Chief Justice Roberts made precisely this point
in oral argument, suggesting that Humphrey's Executor alone is
not sufficient to validate the good cause provision in PCAOB.
Speaking to Solicitor General Kagan, the Chief Justice
commented, "But you have to add to Humphrey's, Perkins54 and
Morrison. Humphrey's says you can limit the President's
removal power. That doesn't get you down to the Board. You
have to also say the principal officers, there can be limits on their
removal authority over the board members."55 It is the
application of Morrison, in other words, that "get[s] you down to
the Board."56
But once the analysis in comparison to Morrison is launched
on those terms, Morrison creates a larger challenge for
defending the PCAOB. Whereas the removal power over the
independent counsel was vested in the Attorney General, the
paradigm of an officer serving at the President's pleasure,
PCAOB's removal is vested in the SEC, itself an independent
agency. This difference confronted Solicitor General Kagan with
a stark choice. On the one hand, she could simply jettison
Morrison, an unappealing prospect. Or she could try to fit the
PCAOB under Morrison.

To take the second course, however, would require likening
the President's authority over the Attorney General to the
President's authority over the SEC. That is what Solicitor
General Kagan did. Addressing Morrison,57 Solicitor General
53. Id. at 48.
54. United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886) (upholding Congress's power to
impose good cause restrictions on removal of inferior officers whose appointments are
vested in heads of departments).
55. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Free Enterprise Fund, No. 08-861; see also
id. at 47 ("It goes further [than Humphrey's Executor] because you have got to rely on
the SEC to get to the Board. So there you have got to rely on Perkins and Morrison.").
56. Id.
57. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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Kagan argued in the brief for the United States, "just as the
Attorney General had the power to remove an independent
counsel for good cause (487 U.S. at 663), the SEC has the power58
to remove members of the PCAOB for 'good cause shown.'
The strategic motivation for this analogy is clear. If the analogy
holds, then Morrison v. Olson provides strong support for the
constitutionality of the removal restrictions applicable to the
PCAOB: If good cause removal of an inferior officer may be
constitutionally vested in the Attorney General (which Morrison
establishes), and the President has authority over the SEC that is
analogous to his authority over the Attorney General (Solicitor
General Kagan's implication), then the removal restrictions for
the PCAOB are unproblematic.
But the Solicitor General's implication is an important and
revealing one. If the President's control over independent
agencies is substantially similar to his control over at-will
appointees, the thrust of the distinction between independent
and executive agencies which Reagan Administration lawyers
sought to overturn has dissipated. Solicitor General Kagan's
arguments in the PCAOB litigation reach nearly that far. At oral
argument, Chief Justice Roberts asked Solicitor General Kagan
how much protection good cause protections provide. Her
answers were equivocal:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Can the President pick
up the phone and fire the SEC commissioners?
GENERAL KAGAN: The President can pick up the
phone and fire the SEC commissioners for cause,
however 'cause' has been defined.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What do they have to
say about the theory that the SEC Commissioners can
be removed by the President?
GENERAL KAGAN: I believe, Mr. Chief Justice, that
nobody has contested that question.
CHIEF JUSTICE
contesting it?

ROBERTS:

And you

are not

GENERAL KAGAN: And we are not contesting the
question that the SEC commissioners, themselves, are
58.

Brief for the United States, supra note 50, at 49.
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removable by the President for cause under, I would
say, a very broad for cause provision, in the way that
Bowsher suggested, not something that is niggling and
technical.59
In view of the comparison between the Attorney General
and the SEC in the brief for United States, it is easy to
understand how Chief Justice Roberts could have taken the
Solicitor General to be putting into issue the grounds for
removal of SEC commissioners. The Solicitor General's
comparison between the SEC and the Attorney General does
just that. Moreover, her emphasis on the "plenary control" the
SEC has over the PCAOB,' despite the good cause removal
provision, also supports the idea that the President has similar
plenary authority over the SEC. If one good cause provisions
allows plenary control, why wouldn't another, especially where,
as in the case of the SEC, good cause protection has to be
implied from the fixed terms of the Commissioners?61
Solicitor General Kagan's account of the good cause
provision protecting the PCAOB ultimately takes the position
that Morrison suggested: while good cause protections are not
unconstitutional, they must be construed to provide significant
authority for the President to terminate (and thus to practically
direct) the officials they protect. The seeds of this position
appear in Bowsher, where the Court read the Congress's power
to terminate the Comptroller General for cause as creating a
subservience on the part of the Comptroller General.62 But it was
the analogy between special prosecutor and independent counsel
created in the Regan Administration's attempt to avoid review
of the independent counsel statute, that put good cause
restrictions and at-will appointment on a similar footing. The
Court's decision in Morrison v. Olson amplified that parity, but
did so only as to the independent counsel's protections, not
those of an independent agency. Morrison left open the question
of whether that same broadening of what constitutes good cause
applies, not just to the Attorney General's supervision of the
independent counsel, but also to the construction of good cause
provisions more generally.
59. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 55, at 46, 52.
60. Brief for the United States, supra note 50, at 42.
61. No statutory provision grants the Commissioners of the SEC good-cause
removal protection. The SEC Commissioners are appointed for fixed, staggered terms.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006).
62. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986).
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Solicitor General Kagan provides a positive answer. On the
one hand, her answer contradicts the conventional
understanding, shared by the Reagan Department of Justice, of
these provisions. Indeed, as Justice Scalia noted in the oral
argument of the PCAOB case, advisers to President Reagan, of
which he was one, took good cause provisions to impose a
serious constraint on presidential influence:
MR. LAMKEN: Your Honor, the President has the
same control over the SEC's provision over the Board
as he has over everything else that falls within the SEC's
jurisdiction.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Which is nothing, which is nothing.
I-when I was-I advised the President, you can't
interfere with-I think, if the President called up the
FCC and said, I want you to rule this way, I want this
kind of rule from the FCC, I think there would be an
impeachment motion in Congress.63
On the other hand, Solicitor General Kagan's answer also results
in roughly the same practical authority for the President over
independent agencies as a constitutional invalidation of good
cause provisions might. It reaches this result, however, through
statutory construction. President Obama's defense of the
constitutionality of the PCAOB thus simultaneously contradicts
the Reagan Administration's view that independent agencies
infringe the President's Article II powers and embraces the
position they sought to establish that the President retains
substantial, almost plenary, control over agencies despite their
"independent" status.
III. CONCLUSION
What are we to make of this shift? To be sure, it could be
well explained by a variety of considerations of legal strategy
and the context of the case. The Supreme Court's decision to
review the case thrust the Obama Administration in the position
of having to take a view on this controversial issue. Given that
the Administration was not inclined politically or legally to see
the PCAOB invalidated, it made sense for Solicitor General
Kagan to emphasize the scope of authority Bowsher and
Morrison seemed to suggest removal provisions allow the
President. Moreover, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 provided
63.

Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote 55, at 58-59.

HeinOnline -- 26 Const. Comment. 599 2009-2010

600

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 62:583

truly broad powers to the SEC with regard to its supervision of
the PCAOB, including requiring the SEC's approval before
PCAOB's rules become effective, 64 requiring the PCAOB to
conduct investigations of registered accounting firms in
accordance with SEC rules,65 making disciplinary sanctions of the
PCAOB subject to de novo review by the SEC, vesting the SEC
with authority to rescind the PCAOB's enforcement authority,'
among other things.
But Solicitor General Kagan's position may also reflect a
deeper view about the relative allocation of power between
Congress and the President. By defending the scope of the
President's control under statute, in principle Solicitor General
Kagan provides a space for congressional dialogue as to the
structure of relations among the executive branch that would not
be allowed by most constitutional rulings invalidating the good
cause restriction. A construction of the Sweeping Clause67
generous to congressional power may underpin Solicitor
General Kagan's statutory defense of the PCAOB. That view
might be political expedient for a political party that has had
greater influence over Congress than the Presidency in recent
decades. Solicitor General Kagan's defense of the PCAOB's,
while consistent with a reading of the Sweeping Clause that
grants Congress wide latitude in structuring the executive
branch, does not require it. As a result, a conclusion about the
Obama Administration's view of the balance between executive
and legislative authority under the Constitution will have be
supported on other grounds.
In the end, we can see that Morrison and PCAOB hold
parallel lessons for the Reagan and Obama Administrations.
The Reagan Administration sought to avoid litigating Morrison
precisely because the independent counsel statute held too
strong a prospect for a Supreme Court decision validating
removal restrictions. While the Reagan Administration did lose
in Morrison, the Court ruled in a way that granted the
Administration much of the legal grounds for presidential
control that it sought to exercise.

64.
65.

15 U.S.C. § 7217(b)(2) (2006).
Id.§ 7215(b)(1).

66. Id.
§ 7217(d)(1).
67. See U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 18 ("Congress shall have Power... [t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.").
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The PCAOB litigation was also uninvited by President
Obama. The Obama Administration sought to avoid a Supreme
Court hearing in PCAOB in part because it is difficult to see a
clear path to upholding the agency based on the Supreme
Court's precedent. Moreover, the agency, staffed by highly paid
Obama
The
public appeal.
little
had
accountants,
Administration's defense of PCAOB embraces the full scope of
flexibility in interpreting good cause restrictions that Morrison
invited. But, like the Reagan Administration, the Obama
Administration may well also face defeat in this unwelcome
litigation.
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